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THE RISING TIDE OF NORTH CAROLINA
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION IN THE
NEW MILLENNIUM
J. MICHAEL McGUINNESS 1
These fundamental [state constitutional] guarantees are very broad in
scope, and are intended to secure to each person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state extensive individual rights, including that of personal
liberty.2
The new millennium has brought new governmental dangers and
significant developments in both federal and North Carolina constitu-
tional law. While many federal developments appear to track changes
in political ideology, North Carolina constitutional law has served as a
more stable bedrock foundation for the protection of individual rights.
During the Warren and Burger Courts, most litigants with governmen-
tal disputes or civil liberties claims sought constitutional protection in
federal forums. However, many historically recognized federal consti-
tutional rights have recently been eroded and some have been obliter-
ated.3 At the same time, the North Carolina Constitution became
1. J. Michael McGuinness represents individuals in constitutional litigation. Mr.
McGuinness is a board certified civil trial advocate, National Board of Trial Advocacy.
Mr. McGuinness practices from his offices in Elizabethtown, N.C. and Washington,
D.C. He may be reached at: jmichael@mcguinnesslaw.com or 910-862-7087. This
article is dedicated to the late Senator and Justice, Sam J. Ervin Jr., who recognized the
values and broad scope of the North Carolina Constitution in the 1940s. Justice
Ervin's work and scholarship laid the foundations for North Carolinians to use our
State Constitution to challenge the growing abuse of government power. © All Rights
Reserved. 2005
2. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949)(Ervin, J.).
3. Fourth Circuit retreats are legion. E.g., Gravitte v. N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles,
33 Fed. Appx. 45 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding the discriminatory imposition of ticket
quotas on law enforcement officers with discipline for non-compliance with quotas is
constitutional); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(overruling prior settled circuit precedent); Kirby v. Elizabeth City, 388 F.3d 440 (4th
Cir. 2004); See generally R. Barnett, Restoring The Lost Constitution (2004) (presenting
extensive arguments demonstrating how federal courts have recently ignored
constitutional liberties). The Fourth Circuit attempted to overrule Miranda. See U.S.
v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom., Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S.
428 (2000).
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"a beacon of civil rights ... .
Unlike many federal courts, the North Carolina appellate courts
have generally avoided rapid doctrinal changes in constitutional law.
In North Carolina, the path of state constitutional law has been more
stable and predictable, maturing gradually as circumstances have
evolved under growing government regulation and abuse. In 1992, fol-
lowing Corum v. University of North Carolina,' Justice Harry Martin
explained:
The Constitution of North Carolina offers especially fertile ground for
practitioners seeking to protect their clients' civil rights because the
document itself provides certain protections that do not appear in the
federal counterpart .... The Constitution of North Carolina is a bea-
con of civil rights .... The North Carolina Constitution is the people's
timeless shield against encroachment on their civil rights. During the
past decade, North Carolina practitioners and the North Carolina
Supreme Court have shaken the cobwebs from the state's fundamental
charter, making it clear that the state constitution is a living, breathing
document.6
The Declaration of Rights in the North Carolina Constitution pro-
vides rich text for potentially broad application in many contemporary
contexts. The preamble emphasizes "the existence of our civil, politi-
cal and religious liberties . . . ." In Article I, the Declaration of Rights
recognizes "the great, general, and essential principles of liberty ... "8
Various provisions of the North Carolina Constitution afford greater
and more specific protection than provided by the United States Con-
stitution.9 Due to the perpetual growth and abuse of government
power by local and state government in North Carolina, the need for
4. Justice Harry Martin, The State As a "Font of Individual Liberties": North
Carolina Accepts the Challenge, 70 N.C.L. Rev. 1749, 1753 (1992). Many have
observed the revitalization of state constitutional law since the 1970s. See McAffee &
Quinlar, Bringing Forward the Right to Bear Arms, 75 N.C.L. Rev. 781, 888-89 (1997);
Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1803, 1804 (1992)
(noting "strategic advantages to pleading today's civil liberties cases in state court on
state constitutional grounds ...... ).
5. Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992). Corum was
perhaps the leading case that reenergized the North Carolina Constitution as a
foremost tool to combat abusive government power in North Carolina.
6. Martin, supra note 4, at 1752-57.
7. N.C. CONST. pmbl.
8. Id. at art. I.
9. See Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290 (citing Lamb v. Wedgewood
South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983)); Martin, supra note 4, at 1749; J.
Exum, Dusting Off Our State Constitution, N. C. ST. BAR Q., Spring 1986, at 6-8.
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North Carolina constitutional protection for individuals has never
been greater.
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Rehnquist, reaffirmed that a State may "adopt in its own Constitu-
tion individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the
Federal Constitution."1 ° North Carolina has continued to enforce the
core of its own constitutional backbone.11 North Carolina courts have
interpreted the State Constitution to grant rights broader than the Fed-
eral Constitution.1 2 Federal decisions do not bind North Carolina
courts on issues of North Carolina constitutional law.1 3 In Lowe v.
Tarble,14 our Supreme Court observed that relief may be granted
under our State Constitution where no relief is available under the Fed-
eral Constitution. Our Supreme Court has mandated that the North
10. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
11. See Chief Justice James Exum, Symposium: "The Law of the Land": The North
Carolina Constitution and State Constitution: Rediscovering State Constitutions, 70 N.C.L.
Rev. 1741, 1743 (1992); Martin, supra note 4, at 1757; Boutwell, The Cause of Action
for Damages Under The North Carolina Constitution: Corum v. University of North
Carolina, 70 N.C. L. Rev. 1899, 1899 (1992), and other authorities cited herein. In
Whaley v. Lenoir County, 5 N.C. App. 319, 168 S.E.2d 411 (1969), the Court of
Appeals relied upon the North Carolina Constitution in striking down an ambulance
regulation as unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the "state, cannot, under the
guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit
lawful occupations or impose unnecessary or unreasonable restrictions on them...".
Id. at 324, 168 S.E.2d at 414. The Court concluded that the ordinance invaded "the
personal and property rights guaranteed by" the State Constitution. Id. at 327, 168
S.E.2d at 416.
12. E.g., State v. Cunningham, 108 N.C. App. 185, 195-96, 423 S.E.2d 802, 808-09
(1992); State v. Fennell, 95 N.C. App. 140, 143, 382 S.E.2d 231, 232-33 (1989); Lowe
v. Tarable, 313 N.C. 460, 461, 462, 329 S.E.2d 649-51 (1985); Martin, supra note 4, at
1750, and other authorities herein.
13. See McNeil v. Harnett County, 327 N.C. 552, 563, 398 S.E.2d 475, 481 (1990);
Evans v. Cowan, 132 N.C. App. 1, 5-6, 510 S.E.2d 170, 174 (1999), 122 N.C. App. 181,
183, 468 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1996) aff'd, 345 N.C. 177, 477 S.E.2d 926 (1996) (per
curiam) (noting the North Carolina Constitution may provide greater protections).
14. 313 N.C. 460, 462, 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985). One of the justifications for
our federal system of multiple constitutions is to provide the people of each state with
a system of double protection from encroachment by either the state or federal
governments. See THE FEDERALIST, Number 45 (J. Madison). There are hundreds of
cases in which state appellate courts have found that state constitutions provide
greater protections than those afforded under the Federal Constitution. Teachout,
Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the
Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 Vermont L. Rev. 13, 15 (1988).
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Carolina Constitution must be liberally construed, especially those
provisions safeguarding individual liberty.' 5
This article outlines a number of recent developments in North
Carolina constitutional law, focusing primarily upon the most com-
mon areas where individuals need protection from abusive government
power. Recent cases have demonstrated the growth and abuse of gov-
ernment power in North Carolina, from the smallest municipalities to
the massive North Carolina state government bureaucracy. State con-
stitutional checks and balances are necessary.
I. THE PROBLEM OF ABUSIVE GOVERNMENT POWER IN NORTH CAROLINA
As Judge Robert Bork demonstrated in his authoritative treatise,
governmentally imposed "political correctness" is rampant. 16 James
Bovard explains17 :
Americans' liberty is perishing beneath the constant growth of govern-
ment power. Federal, state and local governments are confiscating citi-
zens' property, trampling their rights and decimating their
opportunities more than ever before. ... Discretionary authority on the
part of the government means insecurity for legal freedom on the part
of the subjects .... Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are
increasingly under assault by ambitious bureaucrats and spiteful
politicians....
North Carolinians, from all walks of life, need constitutional pro-
tection from increasingly retaliatory, arbitrary and discriminatory gov-
ernment power, more often at the local level. 8 Perhaps the greatest
threat to civil liberties arises close to home, in Raleigh, in county seats,
and in town halls. North Carolinians are pervasively regulated by
growing local governments more than ever before. Sheriffs, police
15. See State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 764-65, 6 S.E.2d 854, 866 (1940); Corum,
330 N.C. at 781-83, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
16. R. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 54, 90, 203, 215, 247, 255, 262 and 333 (1996). See also Edwards v. City of
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999), where the City of Goldsboro retaliated
against and suspended Officer Edwards for teaching an off-duty course under the N.C.
concealed handgun law. The Chief of Police opposed the law and attempted to justify
his conduct because he claimed it was "a bad law." The Fourth Circuit recognized
Edwards' expression and association claims.
17. J. BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 1-3 (1995).
18. SENATOR SAM J. ERVIN, JR., PRESERVING THE CONSTITUTION 165, 213 - 214
(1984); Bovard, supra note 17, at 1-6, 49 - 51; Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Wake County,
905 F. Supp. 312 (E.D.N.C. 1995)(recognizing the availability of substantive due
process protection to challenge arbitrary, capricious and irrational government action;
court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff because of indisputably arbitrary and
capricious governmental conduct).
[Vol. 27:223
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chiefs, town managers, building inspectors, educational superintend-
ents, planners, administrators, technicians, and many other local and
state bureaucrats are more subject to direct political pressures. There-
fore, local bureaucrats appear more prone to violate fundamental con-
stitutional rights such as free expression, association, privacy, due
process, and equal protection. 19
In a variety of cases, the North Carolina Constitution has been
used to restrain North Carolina governments from retaliatory, arbi-
trary and discriminatory actions.20 From Manteo to Murphy, cases
have demonstrated that North Carolina state and local governments
commit acts of abusive misconduct against citizens in their zeal to con-
trol, oppress and retaliate.21
19. See, e.g, Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999); Cromer v.
Brown, 88 F.3d 1315 (4th Cir. 1996); Worrell v. Bedsole, 110 F.3d 62 (4th Cir. 1997);
Piver v. Pender Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1987); Hall v. Marion, 31 F.3d
183 (4th Cir. 1994); Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417 S.E.2d
277 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Wake County, 905 F. Supp. 312 (E.D.N.C.
1995), and other cases cited herein.
20. E.g., Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C. App. 462, 574 S.E.2d 76 (2002) (recognizing
state and federal constitutional claims grounded in equal protection and substantive
due process to challenge retaliatory and discriminatory release of personnel records);
In re Brooks, 143 N.C. App. 601, 548 S.E.2d 748 (2001)(recognizing protection to
preclude dissemination of public employee records); Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow
County, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986), aff'd 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783
(1987) (Treants I)(prohibiting unconstitutionally vague local ordinance); Treants
Enters., Inc. v. Onslow County, 94 N.C. App. 453, 380 S.E.2d 602 (1989)(Treants
II)(same); Howell, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417 S.E.2d 277 (recognizing state and federal
constitutional claims grounded in expression and due process arising from
termination of public employee for having reported malfunctioning firearms); Lenzer
v. Flaherty, 106 N.C. App. 496, 418 S.E.2d 276 (1992) (recognizing constitutional
claims to challenge retaliation from whistleblowing regarding governmental
malfeasance), and other cases cited herein.
21. E.g., Edwards, 178 F.3d 231 (concerning a municipal employer who attempted
to prevent off-duty teaching and protected conduct); Worrell, 110 F.3d 62 (alleging
deputy sheriff was terminated for having reported malfunctioning police equipment);
Piver, 835 F.2d 1076 (addressing a teacher who was transferred for having publicly
supported a colleague); Brewington, 1993 WL 819885 (involving a deputy sheriff who
was terminated for appearing at a City Council meeting and for having earlier
confirmed retaliation by another police agency; partial summary judgment for
Plaintiff), and other cases cited herein.
In Browning-Ferris Indus., Judge Britt addressed the contours of substantive due
process and granted summary judgment for the Plaintiff in an action against Wake
County. The Court reasoned that the governmental action violated substantive due
process:
[I]f it is arbitrary or capricious, lacks a rational basis, or is undertaken with
improper motives. Walz v. Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1995) (improper
motive); Marks v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 88 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1989)
5
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Small towns generate the most interesting scenarios and horror
stories. Small diners and coffee shops frequently cook up more than
grits and barbeque; they are often places where the seeds of govern-
mental misconduct are planted.22 For example, recently in the small
town of Marshall, the town government did not like how plaintiff
danced at a town community center and consequently banned her
from the facility and threatened her with a trespass charge if she
danced there again.23 Marshall held public events including dances
every Friday night.24 After a decade of dancing there, Ms. Willis, a
fifty six year. old woman, was warned to "tone it down," apparently in
reference to her style of dance. 25 She was accused of dancing "exuber-
antly and flamboyantly," which upset "certain members of the commu-
nity."'26 Without charges or a hearing, Ms. Willis was then banned
from dancing at the facility. 27
Many local governments continue to tread into the most prohib-
ited areas. For example, in Elizabeth City, up until 2003 following liti-
gation, the City required police officers to adhere to the following
policy: "Criticism of any department, operation, employee or policy of
local government will not be made outside of this department. Criti-
cisms shall be transmitted through the chain of command for appro-
priate consideration."28
In Elizabethtown, the Town promises a panoply of employment
rights to employees through its personnel policy including the right to
have a grievance hearing. However, rather than providing a hearing,
(improper motive); Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1988) (improper
motive); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983)
(arbitrariness); Dale v. City of Morganton, 270 N.C. 567, 572, 155 S.E.2d
136, 141 (1967) (improper motive). 905 F. Supp. 312, 319.
22. E.g., Bell v. Carteret County, (E.D.N.C. 87-37-CIV-4) (Political employment
retaliation case arising from plans originating from the "liars table" in a Beaufort
diner; a defendant acknowledged relying upon the antiquated proposition "to the
victors go the spoils.").
23. Willis v. Town of Marshall, 2003 WL 22231259 (W.D.N.C. 2003). The District
Court declined to adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommended decision affording relief
on several constitutional grounds. 293 F. Supp. 2d 608 (W.D.N.C. 2003). An appeal to
the Fourth Circuit is pending.
24. Willis v. Town of Marshall, 2003 WL 22231259 *1 (W.D.N.C. 2003).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *1-2.
28. Eley v. City of Elizabeth City, (E.D.N.C. No. 2 :02-CV-27-BO)(1)(unpublished
decision)(emphasis added). Loyalty oath and other cases from the 1950's struck such
direct censorship as unconstitutional.
228 [Vol. 27:223
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the Town substituted a novel proceeding known as an "offering.
29
Under the Town's "offering" procedure, the employee is barred from
calling any witness, is barred from testifying, and may not cross
examine or challenge the decision maker. The "offering" allows the
decision maker to consider "secret" information not known or pro-
vided to the grievant, refuse to provide a written factual statement even
where the decision maker is the key fact witness in the controversy,
and expressly bars other willing employee witnesses from providing
written statements to the grievant so that he can submit them at the
"offering."'30 The Town allows the grievant to write up what he or she
wants and offer it to the town manager. The Town calls this "due pro-
cess" and "fairness. 3 1
A broad range of cases, including government contracts, land use
disputes, building permit squabbles, business regulation, education,
licensing and permit schemes, law enforcement disputes, occupational
licensing and regulation, public employment, and other governmental
disputes, necessitate application of North Carolina constitutional prin-
ciples. Some state agencies have promulgated undefined "morals"
codes which subject licensees to career deprivation without notice of
prohibited conduct or any definition of "good moral character.
'32 One
state regulatory agency refers to regulated public employees as
"targets. '33 These and other areas of government regulation are where
meaningful state constitutional protection is sorely needed.
11. SOME KEY PROVISIONS WITHIN THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
A glimpse at the text of the Declaration of Rights in Article I of the
North Carolina Constitution reveals numerous provisions which afford
substantial constitutional rights for North Carolinians. The Equality
of Rights provision provided in Article I, Section 1 provides a sweeping
constitutional guarantee that all persons enjoy "inalienable rights ...
[including] life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor,
and the pursuit of happiness. 34 Section 12 provides for rights of
assembly and petition, which is analogous to the Petition Clause in the
29. In re Roger Paschal (Employee Grievance; unpublished).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 12 r. 9B. 0101 (2004).
33. Wood v. N.C. Criminal Justice Training and Standards Commission, 01 DOJ
0478, (deposition testimony of agency investigator).
34. N.C. CONST. art. I § 1.
7
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First Amendment and the right to freedom of association.35 Section 13
provides for religious liberty.36
Section 14 guarantees freedom of speech and of the press.37 This
text is especially compelling: "freedom of speech and of the press are
two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be
restrained, but every person shall be held responsible for their
abuse. 38 Section 15 allows for a constitutional "privilege of educa-
tion."39 Section 16 provides a constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws.4 ° Section 18 contains the "Open Courts" Clause.4 1
Section 19, generally known as the "Law of the Land Clause," enu-
merates multiple protections.42 First, it provides that no person shall
be deprived of liberties or privileges or otherwise deprived of life, lib-
erty or property except by the law of the land.43 This guarantees both
procedural and substantive due process.44 It further provides that "no
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws."'4 ' Finally, it
grants protection against suspect class discrimination on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin.46
Beginning with Section 20 of Article I, the North Carolina Consti-
tution conveys a number of specific requirements applicable to crimi-
nal defendants and criminal proceedings.4 7 Section 25 grants the right
of jury trial in civil cases. 48 Section 30 gives the state constitutional
right to bear arms. 49 Section 35 provides a rule of constitutional con-
struction that "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
absolute necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty."' 0
Section 36 explains that "the enumeration of rights in this article
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the peo-
ple."'" This section is similar to the Ninth Amendment of the Federal
35. Id. at § 12.
36. Id. at § 13.
37. Id. at § 14.
38. Id.
39. See Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 357, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (1997).
40. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 16.
41. Id. at § 18.
42. Id. at § 19.
43. Id.
44. In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 97-98, 221 S.E.2d 307, 309 (1976).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at § 20.
48. Id. at § 25.
49. Id. at § 30.
50. Id. at § 35.
51. Id. at § 36.
230 [Vol. 27:223
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Constitution, which provides for other rights not specifically enumer-
ated in the Federal Bill of Rights.52 Finally, Section 37 provides a num-
ber of specific rights for victims of crime. 3
Several provisions of the North Carolina Constitution are ripe for
application to a broad range of governmental conduct which deprives
individuals of liberty. Article I, Section 1 is a source of direct protec-
tion for employee rights and for liberty generally. Justice Ervin's bril-
liant opinion in State v. Ballance 4 broadly defines constitutional
liberty.
These fundamental [state constitutional] guarantees are very broad in
scope, and are intended to secure to each person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state extensive individual rights, including that of personal
liberty. The term "liberty," as used in these constitutional provisions,
does not consist simply of the right to be free from arbitrary physical
restraint or servitude, but is "deemed to embrace the right of man to be
free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed
by his Creator," subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare .... it includes the right of the citizen to be free to use
his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or voca-
tion, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a
successful conclusion.55
Justice Ervin's teachings molded solid foundations of liberty and
constitutional construction that have well served for over a half a
century.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that "[any exercise
by the State of its police power is, of course, a deprivation of liberty.
5 6
For example, in Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach,57 the Court of
Appeals recognized the deprivation of a liberty interest in a public
employment case. Officer Howell was allegedly fired for reporting mal-
functions in police weapons and because of his political campaign
52. Id. at amend. IX.
53. Id. at § 37.
54. 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949). See also State v. Warren, 252 N.C.
690, 694, 114 S,E,2d 660 (1960); Roller v. Mien, 245 N.C. 516, 518-522, 96 S.E. 851,
854-857 (1957).
55. State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949) (quoting Am. Jur.,
Constitutional Law, section 329).
56. In re Ashton Park Hospital, 282 N.C. 542, 550, 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (1973).
Accord State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 758, 6 S.E.2d 854, 862 (1940) (explaining the
right to pursue a means of livelihood is both a property right and personal liberty).
57. 106 N.C. App. 410, 417 S.E.2d 277, 283 (1992).
20051
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activities.5 8 Howell's interests in expression and political activities
were held to constitute viable constitutional liberty interests.5 9 The
Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment for the defendants and
held that Howell enjoyed expression, liberty and due process claims.6 °
III. FUNDAMENTALS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Even before federal recognition of judicial review, North Carolina
was out front asserting judicial authority to strike unconstitutional leg-
islation, as North Carolina constitutional heritage predates Marbury v.
Madison.6 1 In 1787, with the case of Bayard v. Singleton,62 our
Supreme Court declared a North Carolina statute unconstitutional
under the State Constitution. Over two hundred years later, in State Ex
Rel. Martin v. Preston,63 the North Carolina Supreme Court high-
lighted some state constitutional legal history. After analyzing Bayard
v. Singleton, the Court explained that in 1805, University v. Foy64
"became one of the first courts to define the modern concept of due
process of law. ",65 North Carolina was an early leader in constitutional
law and has continued that proud heritage into the new millennium.66
Early cases demonstrated the broad reach of the North Carolina
Constitution.67 In Bizzell v. Board of Alderman68 in 1926, the plaintiff
contended that an ordinance was unconstitutional because it vested
arbitrary discretion in public officials without prescribing uniform reg-
ulations. 69 The ordinance provided that no gasoline filling or storage
station should be located, conducted or operated in the City "without
58. Id. at 420-21, 417 S.E.2d at 283-84.
59. Id. at 421, 417 S.E.2d at 283.
60. Id.
61. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
62. 1 N.C. 5, 5-6 (1787). See John V. Orth, "Fundamental Principles" In North
Carolina Constitutional History, 69 N.C.L. Rev. 1357 (1991).
63. 325 N.C. 438, 385 S.E.2d 473 (1989). See Comment, Political Patronage and
North Carolina Law: Is Political Conformity With the Sheriff A Job Requirement For
Deputies, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1743 (2001).
64. 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805) (recognizing the supremacy of rights protected by
Article I of the North Carolina Constitution). See Corum, 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d
290.
65. Preston, 325 N.C. at 448, 385 S.E.2d at 478.
66. E.g., Martin, supra note 4, at 1752-57.
67. E.g., State v. Tenant, 110 N.C. 609, 14 S.E. 387 (1892).
68. 192 N.C. 348, 353-54, 135 S.E. 50, 52-53 (1926).
69. Seventy years later, the City of Elizabeth City still had a direct anti-speech
regulation in effect up until litigation in 2003 which provided direct prohibitions on
police officer speech: "Criticism of any department, operation, employee or policy of
local government will not be made outside of this department. Criticisms shall be
232 [Vol. 27:223
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first obtaining consent from the board of aldermen.. .. ,,70 Bizzell held
that the ordinance was unconstitutional:
The ordinances are far-reaching, and the law does not permit the enjoy-
ment of one's property to depend upon the arbitrary or despotic will of
officials, however well-meaning, or to restrict the individual's right of
property or lawful business without a general or uniform rule applica-
ble to all alike.
No ordinance is enforceable in matters of this kind, a lawful business,
that does not make a general or uniform rule of equal rights to all and
applicable to all alike- - then there can be no special privilege or favorit-
ism. The ordinance gives the power to the board of aldermen at their
pleasure to grant one person a license and refuse another under the
same circumstances .... The right of individuals to engage in any law-
ful calling and use their property for lawful purposes is guaranteed to
them, and any unreasonable restraint or oppressive exaction upon the
use of property and utmost liberty of business growth and advance-
ment is contrary to the fundamental law of the land.71
IV. JUSTICE ERVIN LED THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHARGE IN THE
1940s AND THEREAFTER
Justice Sam Ervin vigorously applied North Carolina constitu-
tional law as Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court.72 He
earned national respect as a leading constitutional scholar. As Justice
Ervin explained in his authoritative treatise,73 North Carolina courts
have made "rich contributions to good government, the rule of law and
liberty." He observed "the struggle of the people against arbitrary gov-
ernmental power ...  He also explained how "freedom of speech is
in great peril."7 Justice Ervin's concerns about arbitrary government
power and its dangers to free speech have been demonstrated in case
after case in the twenty years since his treatise.76
transmitted through the chain of command for appropriate consideration." See Eley,
(2:02-CV-27-B0-1).
70. Bizzell, 192 N.C. at 350, 135 S.E. at 51.
71. Id. at 358, 135 S.E. at 55.
72. See e.g., Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731; State v. Bridges, 231 N.C. 163,
56 S.E.2d 397 (1949).
73. Ervin, supra note 18, at 49.
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id. at 214.
76. E.g. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Edwards, 178 F.3d 231;
Worrell, 110 F.3d 62; Piver, 835 F.2d 1076; Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp.
2d 647 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Brewington, 1993 WL 819885, and other cases cited herein.
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Another esteemed North Carolina jurist, who served both as a
North Carolina and federal judge, strongly encouraged use of the
North Carolina Constitution. Judge Braxton Craven explained:
It is strangely sad to me that scarcely anyone even thinks of a state
constitution when he speaks of constitutional law. It is too bad. There
is gold in the state constitutions. . . the result has been an almost com-
plete reliance upon the federal Constitution for the protection of indi-
vidual liberty and the instrument is not well adapted to the
undertaking.
7 7
Recent cases illustrate the independent and specific nature of the
North Carolina Constitution.78  These cases derive substance from
many historic cases.79 They demonstrate how North Carolina courts
have been open to resolve constitutional disputes between citizens and
government at all levels in North Carolina. Justice Harry Martin
observed that "North Carolina has been at the head of the movement
to energize state constitutional law."8"
In In Re Application of Ellis,81 our Supreme Court held that the
action of county commissioners denying an application for a permit to
establish a mobile home park as a special exception was arbitrary and
capricious where all ordinance requirements were met. The Court rea-
soned that the commissioners could not deny a permit "solely
because, in their view, a mobile-home park would 'adversely affect the
public interest.'82 The commissioners must also proceed under stan-
77. Ervin, supra note 18, at 384.
78. See, e.g., Corum, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276; State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297,
357 S.E.2d 622 (1987); Treants 1, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (1986), affd as
modified 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783(1987), and other cases cited herein.
79. E.g., Gunter v. Town of Sanford, 186 N.C. 452, 120 S.E. 41 (1923) (explaining
the North Carolina Constitution prohibits the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government); State v. Godwin, 216 N.C. 49, 3 S.E.2d 347 (1939) (declaring Open
Courts Clause in North Carolina Constitution a fundamental right); In re Martin, 295
N.C. 291, 245 S.E.2d 766 (1978); Henry v. Edmisten, 315 N.C. 474, 340 S.E.2d 720
(1986) (construing Article I, Section 19); Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648
(1985) (explaining substantive due process is a guarantee against arbitrary
government action), State v. Jones, 53 N.C. App. 466, 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981) affd, 305
N.C. 520, 290 S.E2d 675 (1982) (stating substantive due process requires that police
power may be exercised only as it promotes legitimate public health, safety or general
welfare).
80. Martin, supra note 4, at 1751, citing among many cases, State v. Carter, 322
N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988) (holding that the North Carolina constitutional
clause forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures is not subject to a good faith
exception); State v. Cofield, 320 N.C. 297, 357 S.E.2d 622 (1987).
81. 277 N.C. 419, 178 S.E.2d 77 (1970).
82. Id. at 425, 178 S.E.2d at 81.
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dards, rules, and regulations, uniformly applicable to all who apply for
permits. ' '8 3 In Ellis, the Court explained that decisionmaking based
upon "the arbitrary will of the governing authorities ... is unconstitu-
tional, and void, because it fails to furnish a uniform rule of action and
leaves the right of property subject to the despotic will of [government
officials].... 84
In a leading public employee case, Judge Eugene Gordon reaf-
firmed that the North Carolina Constitution forbids arbitrary and
capricious governmental employment action by public employers.8 5
These equal protection and anti-arbitrariness principles are traced to
many North Carolina cases, from State v. Tenant in 189286 to more
modern cases, such as Maines v. City of Greensboro in 1980.87 In
Maines, the Court held that "an ordinance which vests unlimited or
unregulated discretion in a municipal officer is void."88
V. AUTHORITIES FROM THE 1980s AND BEYOND
In 1986, Former Chief Justice Exum authored Dusting Off Our
State Constitution,8 9 where he explained that "there is a growing
national trend in which state courts look more to their own state con-
stitutions and less to the federal constitution to resolve legal disputes."
Justice Exum observed how the North Carolina Constitution contains
"language [that] is richer, more detailed, and more specific." 90 He
observed that Article I, Sections 12 and 13 of our Constitution "con-
tained broad grants of power to the people."'" He explained that "the
ground in these richly detailed grants of individual liberties" is much
more fertile "than in the mere prohibitions against abridgement of
them found in the federal document."9 2 He also observed how the use
of North Carolina constitutional law will help our state courts be more
creative and original, and will keep state law constant even in the face
83. Id. at 425, 178 S.E.2d at 81.
84. Id. at 425, 178 S.E.2d at 80.
85. See Wall v. Stanly County Bd. of Educ., 259 F. Supp. 238, 249 (M.D.N.C.
1966)(stating citizens "are not at the mercy of any whimsical or arbitrary decision" of
a governmental employer; government must act "in good faith and not arbitrarily,
capriciously."); rev'd on other grounds, 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1967).
86. 110 N.C. 609, 14 S.E. 387 (1892).
87. 300 N.C. 126, 265 S.E.2d 155 (1980).
88. 300 N.C. at 131, 265 S.E.2d at 158.
89. N.C. ST. BAR Q., Spring 1986, at 6.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 7.
92. Id.
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of changing winds which sometimes blow out of Washington. 9 3 Jus-
tice Exum's reasoning was adopted six years later by the Supreme
Court in Corum v. University of North Carolina.94
In the last decade, North Carolina courts have reaffirmed the
breadth of the North Carolina Constitution in a series of public
employee constitutional cases.9" Public employment relationships are
particularly susceptible to bureaucratic power struggles, local politics
and other conditions which breed oppression, retaliation and discrimi-
nation, therefore necessitating constitutional protection. Each of the
cases in the foregoing note reaffirmed application of the North Caro-
lina Constitution to public employees and precluded employer abuses
and retaliation. In Debnam v. N.C. Dept. of Corrections,96 our Supreme
Court reaffirmed traditional constitutional protection for public
employees during internal investigations.
The North Carolina Constitution has even been held to constitute
a source of public policy for application in common law wrongful dis-
charge cases premised upon the public policy exception. In Vereen v.
Holden,97 the Court of Appeals recognized the North Carolina Consti-
tution as an enforceable basis of common law public policy protection
precluding political considerations in employment terminations.
A. Toomer v. Garrett
In Toomer v. Garrett,98 the Court of Appeals addressed several
North Carolina and federal constitutional claims in a records disclo-
sure dispute involving a former state employee, Algie Toomer. In 1997,
Toomer settled an employment claim with his former employer, the
North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles. 99 Following his settlement,
the Secretary of the Department of Transportation retaliated by releas-
ing Toomer's personnel, medical and other records directly to the news
93. Id. at 8.
94. 330 N.C. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
95. E.g., Toomer, 155 N.C. App. 462, 574 S.E.2d 76; Corum, 330 N.C. 761, 413
S.E.2d 276; Lewis v. City of Kinston, 127 N.C. App. 150, 488 S.E.2d 274 (1997);
Lenzer, 106 N.C. App. 496, 418 S.E.2d 276; Howell, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417 S.E.2d
277; Warren v. New Hanover Bd. of Educ., 104 N.C. App. 522, 410 S.E.2d 232 (1991).
96. 334 N.C. 380, 432 S.E.2d 324 (1993). In Warren v. City of Asheville, 74 N.C.
App. 402, 328 S.E.2d 859 (1985), the Court of Appeals enunciated a framework of
principles governing public employee polygraph testing.
97. 121 N.C. App. 779, 468 S.E.2d 471 (1996).
98. 155 N.C. App. 462, 574 S.E.2d 76 (2002).
99. Id. at 467, 574 S.E.2d at 82. Toomer's first settled claim generated
embarrassing evidence to the government, revealing massive patronage and retaliation
in North Carolina government.
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media.' 00 Toomer's records included his entire personnel history
including his home address, photograph, social security number, edu-
cational history, transcripts, testing data, credit history, financial
information, retirement data, names and addresses of his family mem-
bers, and medical information including medical diagnoses. 10 1 He
was singled out for disparate treatment but other state employees who
settled claims were not similarly subjected to wholesale personnel file
disclosures.' 0 2 The trial court dismissed Toomer's complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim.10 3
The Court of Appeals reversed and found that Toomer stated sev-
eral state and federal constitutional claims, as well as common law
claims for tortious invasion of privacy, negligence and breach of con-
tract.'0 4 Toomer alleged deprivation of his substantive due process,
equal protection, expression and privacy rights. 10 5 The Court
observed that substantive due process protects individuals from gov-
ernment action that unreasonably deprives one of a liberty or property
interest.10 6 The Court concluded that Toomer's privacy interest in his
personnel records did not fall within the recognized fundamental con-
stitutional right to privacy. 10 7 However, the Court held that Toomer
enjoyed a substantive due process claim against arbitrary action that is
so egregious that it "shocks the conscience" or "offends a sense of jus-
tice." '0 8 Toomer's successful substantive due process claim was
grounded in disparate treatment and privacy principles.
The Court of Appeals held that Toomer enjoyed both North Caro-
lina and federal equal protection claims because he was singled out for
disparate treatment when the government publicly released his person-
nel, medical and other records following his settlement whereas other
employees were not subjected to such retaliation. 10 9 Finally, the Court
100. Id.
101. Id.at 467, 574 S.E.2d at 82-83.
102. Id. at 479, 574 S.E.2d at 89.
103. Id. at 476, 574 S.E.2d at 88.
104. Id. at 484, 574 S.E.2d at 93.
105. Id. at 466, 574 S.E.2d at 82.
106. Id. at 469, 574 S.E.2d at 84.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 470, 574 S.E.2d at 84.
109. Id. at 478, 574 S.E.3d at 89. Toomer adopted the "class of one" equal
protection doctrine from Village of Willowbrook v. Olech. See 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
Many cases have applied Willowbrook to various types of governmental misconduct.
See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 110 (2d Cir. 2003); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d
579, 587 (7th Cir. 2001); Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 20041 WL
2066748 at *4 (D. Or. 2004) (applying class of one equal protection theory to public
personnel case); Montanye v. Wissahickon School District, 327 F. Supp. 2d 510, 518-
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found that Toomer had stated several valid common law claims for
relief including tortious invasion of privacy. 1 1° Toomer reaffirmed,
clarified and expanded state constitutional protection for North Caro-
lina public employees.
VI. CORUM AND PRINCIPLES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In Corum v. University of North Carolina,"' our Supreme Court
issued the watershed state constitutional decision of the 1990s.
Corum reaffirmed the importance of free expression for public
employees and held that damage remedies are available for violations
of the North Carolina Constitution. The Court explained:
Our Constitution is more detailed and specific than the federal Consti-
tution in the protection of rights of itsocitizens .... We give our Consti-
tution a liberal interpretation in favor of its citizens with respect to
those provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty and
security of the citizens in regard to person and property. This Court
has recognized a direct cause of action under the State Constitution
against state officials for violation of rights guaranteed by the Declara-
tion of Rights." 2
Corum grew from bedrock cases such as State v. Ballance,113
where our Supreme Court explained, "These fundamental [state con-
stitutional] guarantees are very broad in scope, and are intended to
19 (E.D. Pa. 2004)(same); Bullock v. Gerould, 338 F. Supp. 2d 446 *W.D.NY.
2004)(same); Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647, 660 (W.D.N.C. 2002);
Eberhart v Gettys, 215 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674-75 (M.D.N.C. 2002); Barstow v. Shea, 196
F. Supp. 2d 141, 148-49 (D. Conn. 2002); Kiser v. Naperville Cmty. Unit, 227 F. Supp.
2d 954, 972 (N.D. 111. 2002); Lima v. Decker, 2002 WL 31498998 at * 5 (D.N.H.
2002); Rossi v. City, 246 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Willowbrook
provides a new and distinct equal protection theory, affording broad protection against
disparate treatment by governments in a variety of contexts. See McGuinness, The
Rising Tide of Equal Protection: Willowbrook And The New Non-Arbitrariness Standard,
11 George Mason Civ. Rts. L.J. 263 (2001). Other state courts have expanded equal
protection by applying the Willowbrook principle. E.g., City Recycling v. State, 778 A.
2d 77 (Conn. 2001); See Amy Lousin, Challenges Facing State Constitutions In The
Twenty-First Century, 62 La. L. Rev. 17 (2001).
110. Toomer, 155 N.C. App. at 484, 574 S.E.2d at 93. Following the Court of
Appeals decision, the state settled with Toomer again.
111. 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276 (1992). See Peverall v. County of Almance, 154
N.C. App. 426, 573 S.E.2d 517 (2002).
112. 330 N.C. 761, 783, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992)(internal citations omitted).
113. 229 N.C. 764, 769, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
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secure to each person subject to the jurisdiction of the State extensive
individual rights, including that of personal liberty." '114
Corum involved alleged retaliation against a faculty member at
Appalachian State University, and involved claims under Article I, Sec-
tions 14, 19 and 35 of the North Carolina Constitution, as well as fed-
eral claims."15 The Corum Court enunciated several fundamental
principles as well as rules of state constitutional construction.
116
Construing Article I, Section 14, the Court held that the constitu-
tional text providing that speech "shall never be restrained" is a direct
personal guarantee of each citizen's right of freedom of speech." 7 The
Court reasoned that free speech is a "great bulwark of liberty [and] is
one of the fundamental cornerstones of individual liberty and one of
the great ordinances of our Constitution.""" It also reasoned that "it
is the state judiciary that has the responsibility to protect the state
constitutional rights of the citizens; this obligation to protect the fun-
damental rights of individuals is as old as the state.""' 9 The Corum
Court went on to explain that "our Constitution is more detailed and
specific than the Federal Constitution in the protection of the rights of
its citizens.' 1
20
In Treants Enterprises, Inc. v. Onslow County, 2 ' the North Caro-
lina appellate courts declared the right to earn a livelihood is a "funda-
mental" constitutional right under the North Carolina Constitution.'22
In Treants, the Court illustrated the broad scope of Article I, Section 1,
which declares that among the inalienable rights of the people are life,
liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor, and the pursuit
of happiness. Treants recognized an expanded basis of state constitu-
tional protection, particularly for public employees where the right to
earn a living is directly in issue, and reaffirmed that citizens can
114. Id. at 769, 51 S.E.2d at 734 (emphasis added). In re Martin demonstrated that
"[ilt is well established that, in construing either the federal or State Constitution,
what is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressly stated." 295
N.C. 291, 299, 245 S.E.2d 766, 771 (1978).
115. Corum, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 781, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
118. Id. at 782, 413 S.E.2d at 289.
119. Id. at 783, 413 S.E.2d at 290.
120. Id. (citing Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868
(1983)).
121. 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365.
122. Id. at 354, 350 S.E.2d at 371.
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enforce state constitutional rights to prohibit "irrational and arbitrary"
governmental conduct. 
12 3
A. The Speech Clause
The North Carolina Free Speech Clause contained in Article 1,
Section 14 provides that: "Freedom of speech and of the press are two
of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained,
but every person shall be held responsible for their abuse."' 24 This
rich text lends itself for rigorous application. 25  Government often
appears to be unable to resist retaliation against perceived unpopular
speech. 126
In 1903, the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that
"[t]he Constitution and laws of this State guarantee freedom of
speech . . 127 In State v. Wiggins,' 28 the North Carolina Supreme
Court observed that "[flreedom of speech and protest against the
administration of public affairs .. .is a fundamental right which has
been cherished in this State since long before the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."' 29 Where fun-
damental rights to expression, association or liberty are in issue, strict
123. Id. In Wall v. Stanley County Bd. of Educ., 259 F. Supp. 238, 249 (M.D.N.C.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 378 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1966), the Court held that the
North Carolina Constitution requires that public employers "must act 'in good faith'
and not 'arbitrarily, capriciously, or without cause' or be 'activated by selfish
motives,"' quoting Cody v. Barrett, 200 N.C. 43, 156 S.E. 146 (1930); see Harris v. Bd.
of Educ. of Vance County, 216 N.C. 147, 4 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1939).
124. N.C. CONST., art. I §14.
125. See Heritage Village Church & Missionary Fellowship, Inc. v. State, 40 N.C.
App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473, affd, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980)(explaining
where speech is in issue, a compelling state interest is required to justify an
abridgement of speech). Cf. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12, (Right to Assemble and Petition)
and art. I, § 13, (Religious Liberty).
126. Ervin, supra note 18, at 214; Bovard, supra note 17, at 3; Edwards, 178 F.3d
231. As demonstrated in Brewington, 1993 WL 819885, a Fayetteville City
Councilman told a Cumberland County Commissioner that he would "see to it that
the little [expletive] Randy Brewington would have his [expletive] fired." The
Commissioner then asked the councilman about Brewington's right to free speech.
The councilman responded "[expletive] it doesn't mean anything."
127. Seawell v. Carolina, 133 N.C. 515, 515, 45 S.E. 850, 851 (1903) (involving an
incident where a mob pelted a political candidate for lieutenant governor with eggs on
the face and head, in a region where the candidate's political party was unpopular).
128. 272 N.C. 147, 158 S.E.2d 37 (1967).
129. Id. at 157, 158 S.E.2d at 45.
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scrutiny is required and the government cannot restrict expression
without a compelling governmental interest.
130
In Lenzer v. Flaherty,13 1 the Court of Appeals addressed claims
under Article I, Sections 14 and 19 of the North Carolina Constitution
in a speech retaliation case involving a public employee. Lenzer, a
physician's assistant, was fired by her state employer, the Alcohol
Rehabilitation Center in Butner, for reporting suspected patient abuse
to the State Bureau of Investigation and the State Department of
Human Resources. 132 The Court of Appeals reversed summary judg-
ment for the Defendants on several claims including Lenzer's free
speech claim. 133 The Court of Appeals relied heavily upon Corum's
analysis in recognizing the whistleblower theory of constitutional pro-
tection for public employees. 1
34
In Howell v. Carolina Beach,'35 the Court of Appeals reversed sum-
mary judgment for the defendants in a speech retaliation case arising
out of Officer Howell's job termination for reporting deficiencies in
police equipment and because of Howell's off-duty political activities.
The court explained how a police officer's communications addressing
police equipment problems was of public concern and constitutionally
protected.' 36 The court found expression, due process and liberty
interests for Officer Howell.
137
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth Principles
Constitutional issues of vagueness and overbreadth often arise
from poorly drafted local and state legislation, regulations, ordinances
and policy. Such ill defined regulatory provisions create uncertainty
and inefficiency, and often constitute prior restraints on free expres-
sion and other constitutional rights.
130. See e.g., Rosie J. v. N.C Dep't of Human Res., 347 N.C. 247, 251, 491 S.E.2d
535, 537 (1997); DOT v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 675, 549 S.E.2d 203, 207 (2001);
Heritage Village v. State, 40 N.C. App. 429, 446, 253 S.E.2d 473, 483, affd, 299 N.C.
399, 263 S.E.2d 726 (1980) (compelling governmental interest required).
131. 106 N.C. App. 496, 418 S.E.2d 276.
132. Id. at 500, 418 S.E.2d at 279.
133. Id. at 515, 418 S.E.2d at 288.
134. Id. at 506-10, 418 S.E.2d at 283-85.
135. 106 N.C. App. 410, 417 S.E.2d 277 (1992). In Mansoor v. Trank, 319 F.3d 133
(4th Cir. 2003), the Court held that police officer speech "about various department
policies, ranging from a proposed pay plan to lack of overtime opportunities
protected."
136. Howell, 106 N.C. App. at 419, 417 S.E.2d at 283.
137. Id. at 420-421, 417 S.E.2d at 283-284.
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North Carolina has long prohibited the enactment of regulatory
provisions which are unduly vague or overbroad. 138 The North Caro-
lina test for vagueness provides that "a statute is unconstitutionally
vague if it either: (1) fails to give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited; or 2) fails to pro-
vide explicit standards for those who apply the law."139 A regulation is
"unconstitutionally vague if [individuals] of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."'140
"The overbreadth doctrine holds that a law is void on its face if it
sweeps within its ambit not solely activity that is subject to governmen-
tal control, but also includes within its prohibitions the practice of a
protected constitutional right.' 14 '
In Lewis v. City of Kinston,'42 the Court of Appeals invalidated a
public employee residency requirement on North Carolina constitu-
tional grounds. There, the challenged policy contained a provision
allowing the city manager to grant "extensions" from the residency
requirement but contained no standards or criteria, which essentially
afforded the city manager "practically unlimited discretion .... "1,43
The Court explained that "[a]n ordinance which vests unlimited or
unregulated discretion in a municipal officer is void."'1 4 4
C. The Open Courts Clause
The Open Courts Clause in Section 18 guarantees access to state
courts and provides remedies. 145 It provides that "[a]ll courts shall be
open; every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person,
138. See, e.g., Treants 1, 83 N.C. App. 345, 350 S.E.2d 365 (holding an Oslow
County escort ordinance to be unconstitutionally broad); Treants II, 94 N.C. App. 453,
458, 380 S.E.2d 602 (holding ordinance to be vague, overbroad and in violation of the
constitutional right of freedom of association); South Blvd. Videa & News v. Charlotte
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 129 N.C. App. 282, 498 S.E.2d 623 (1998).
139. State v. Sanford Video & News, Inc., 146 N.C. App. 554, 556, 553 S.E.2d 217,
218 (2001)(omitting internal quotation marks).
140. State v. Hines, 122 N.C. App. 545, 551-52, 471 S.E.2d 109, 113-114 (1996). In
Maines v. Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 265 S.E.2d 155, 259 (1980), the Court held that
"an ordinance which vests unlimited or unregulated discretion in a municipal officer is
void." 300 N.C.126, 131, 265 S.E.2d 155, 158. The Court has explained that
"[d]iscretion without a criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 496 (1953).
141. State v. Hines, 122 N.C. App. 545, 552, 471 S.E.2d 109, 114 (1996) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
142. 127 N.C. App. 150, 488 S.E.2d 274 (1997).
143. Id. at 155, 488 S.E.2d at 277.
144. Id. at 154, 488 S.E.2d at 277.
145. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14.
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or reputation shall remedy any due course of law; and right and justice
shall be administrated without denial or delay."' 46 It has been recog-
nized as fundamental 147 and has been construed as creating a "public
policy... that private litigants have free access to the court ... 14
The Open Courts Clause may preclude our courts from closing their
doors in the name of standing or other obstacles that federal courts
have been using with increasing frequency to keep from hearing
cases. 149 This provision may also serve to limit politicized tort reform
efforts where damages caps are being legislatively proposed to limit
tort recoveries.
D. The Law of the Land Clause
Article I Section 19, commonly known as the "Law of the Land
Clause," guarantees procedural and substantive due process15 0 as well
as equal protection. 15 1 "Due process expresses the requirement of fun-
damental fairness." 152 Due process analysis under the Federal Consti-
146. Id.
147. State v. Godwin, 216 N.C. 49, 3 S.E.2d 347 (1939); Bolick v. American Barmag
Corp, 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 306 N.C. 364,
293 S.E.2d 415 (1982) (holding statute of repose to be unconstitutional).
148. Petrou v. Hale, 43 N.C. App. 655, 658, 260 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1979); see Simeon
v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 378, 451 S.E.2d 858, 871 (1994).
149. See Bolick, 54 N.C. App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (holding statute unconstitutional
in violation of Article I, Section 18 of North Carolina Constitution, which guarantees
access to courts).
150. As explained in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), "the touchstone
of due process involves 'protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government'... .This history reflects the traditional and common sense notion that the
Due Process Clause, like its forbear in the Magna Carta ... was intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government." (quoting Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)).
"There is a species of substantive due process, apart from any specific of the Bill
of Rights ... This is a substantive due process right akin to the 'fundamental fairness'
concept of procedural due process." Wilson v. Beebe 770 F.2d 578, 586-91 (6th Cir.
1985). Substantive due process "is available to protect individual rights against
irrational government action." H. PERRITT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE,
§ 6.13 at 350 (2d ed. 1987).
151. See In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 101, 221 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1976) (recognizing
distinctions in procedural and substantive due process); Parker v. Stewart, 29 N.C.
App. 747, 225 S.E.2d 632 (1976). See also Jeffrey, Equal Protection In State Courts: The
New Economic Equality Rights, 17 LAw & INEQ. 239 (1999).
152. Roanoke Chowan Reg'l Hous. Auth. v. Vaughn, 81 N.C. App. 354, 359, 344
S.E.2d 578, 582 (1986).
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tution is persuasive but not controlling in construing the Law of the
Land Clause. 15
3
In Dombrowlski v. Wall,' 5 4 a near treatise on disparate treatment
and North Carolina constitutional law, the Court of Appeals found a
violation of equal protection and reaffirmed numerous fundamental
principles:
The Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government officials
"from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression." . . . Since the time of our early explanations of due pro-
cess, we have understood the core of the concept to be protection
against arbitrary action. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527
(1884).
We have emphasized time and again that "the touchstone of due pro-
cess is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of govern-
ment," Wolfe v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974), whether the fault
lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, see, e.g., Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972). . ., or in the exercise of power without
any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental
objective, see, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331....
Arbitrary and capricious acts by government are also prohibited under
the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the North Caro-
lina Constitutions. . . . "The purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause . . .is to secure every person within the state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly
constituted agents.'" Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 343 N.C. 426,
433, 471 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1996).
In Toomer v. Garrett, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the princi-
ples of non-suspect class disparate treatment and selective enforce-
ment.15 5 Arbitrary and capricious acts by government are prohibited
under the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the North
153. E.g. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Dist. of North Wilksboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467,
474, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974).
154. 138 N.C. App. 1, 13, 530 S.E.2d 590, 599 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
155. Toomer v. Garret, 155 N.C. App. 462, 574 S.E.2d 76 (2002) Toomer was singled
out for disparate treatment in post-settlement treatment by North Carolina
government. One of the most illuminating selective enforcement cases in North
Carolina appears in Jetstream Aero Services, Inc. v. New Hanover County, 884 F.2d
1388 (4th Cir. 1989). The elements of a selective enforcement claim are: 1) selective
treatment; 2) intent to harm or injure. Id. See also Houck & Sons v. Transylvania
County, 852 F. Supp. 442, 452 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
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Carolina Constitutions. 156 The North Carolina Supreme Court has
held that:
The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause... is to secure every per-
son within the state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary dis-
crimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through duly constituted agents.
157
Article 1, Section 19 also provides for procedural due process pro-
tection.' 5" Procedural due process requires notice and opportunity to
be heard before governmental deprivation of a property or liberty
interest.1 59 Substantive due process affords protection against arbi-
trary or capricious deprivations, or where the government acts pursu-
ant to political, personal or trivial reasons.1
60
Procedural due process requires that a meaningful opportunity to
be heard must be afforded before one can be deprived of a property,
liberty or life interest.' 6 ' These procedural rights are particularly
important because procedural due process is often the only pre-litiga-
156. Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 1966)(en banc). The issue is
whether government officials have "singl[ed] out". . an individual "for adverse
treatment due to illegitimate, political or, at least, personal motives." Scott v.
Greenville, 716 F.2d 1409, 1420-21 (4th Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted).
Selective enforcement is a valid basis for an equal protection claim. See Oyler v. Boyles,
368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (holding that selective treatment based upon "an
unjustifiable standard" or an "arbitrary classification" violates equal protection).
157. Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 343 N.C. 426, 433, 471 S.E.2d 342, 346
(1996)(internal citations omitted). Similar variations of equal protection principles
appear in federal and other state cases. See Indiana Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm'rs, 101 F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (7th Cir. 1996)("The Equal Protection Clause can
be brought into play as a protection against allowing the government to single out a
hapless individual, firm or other entity for unfavorable treatment."); Bankers Life v.
Grenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988)("[A]rbitrary and irrational discrimination violates
the Equal Protection Clause under even our most deferential standard of review.").
158. E.g., Leiphart v. N.C. Sch. for the Arts, 80 N.C. App. 339, 343, 342 S.E.2d 914,
918 (1986) (just cause standard); see generally Jones v. Dep't of Human Res., 300 N.C.
687, 690, 268 S.E.2d 500, 503-04 (1980).
159. Crump v. Bd. of Educ. , 326 N.C. 603, 392 S.E.2d 579 (1990).
160. See Scott v. Greenville, 716 F.2d 1409, 1420-21 (4th Cir. 1983), and other
cases cited herein.
161. See Fournier v. Reardon, 160 F.3d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1998). In recent years, the
Supreme Court has decided several cases involving the procedural due process rights
of public employees. The modern cases employ a multipart test. First, whether there
is a sufficient interest grounded in state or local law or practice and second, a
balancing test to determine what particular process is due. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); Friendly, "Some Kind Of Hearing", 123 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1267 (1975); Developments In The Law -Public Employment, 97 HARv. L. REv.
1611, (1984).
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tion check on an erroneous governmental decision that may cause
severe injury. The essence of procedural due process "reflects a funda-
mental value in our American constitutional system."'162 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has reaffirmed that "it is fundamental that
both unfairness and the appearance of unfairness should be
avoided.' '1 6
3
"Due process expresses the requirement of fundamental fair-
ness." ' 64 The Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed this requirement of
fundamental procedural and substantive fairness in the leading case of
Dombrowlski v. Wall' 65:
Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we have under-
stood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary action.
[citations omitted].
We have emphasized time and again that "[tihe touchstone of due pro-
cess is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of govern-
ment, [citation omitted] whether the fault lies in a denial of
fundamental procedural fairness, [citation omitted]... or in the exer-
cise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a
legitimate governmental objective. [citation omitted].
While the cases have established a general framework for deter-
mining when and what process is due, the Supreme Court has
declined to specify any litmus test as to what procedural safeguards
must be afforded prior to or after the deprivation. Historically, the
Supreme Court has emphasized a flexible procedural due process
standard whereby a balancing test is employed on a case-by-case basis
to determine what particular process is due in a given situation. 166
The critical importance of procedural due process protections has
long been emphasized. Many cases have "[r]ecognize[ed] and
respect[ed] the role that procedural due process has played in prevent-
ing arbitrary deprivations of individual liberty and property.... 167
162. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971). For an excellent overview of
the doctrine of procedural due process in the public sector workplace, see Silver, 2
Public Employee Discharge and Discipline, ch. 17 (1995).
163. Crump, 326 N.C. at 624, 392 S.E.2d at 590.
164. See Roanoke Chowan Reg'l Hous. Auth. v. Vaughn, 81 N.C. App. 354, 344
S.E.2d 578, 582; Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
165. 138 N.C. App. 1, 530 S.E.2d 590 (2000).
166. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The precise requirements
of procedural due process depend upon the circumstances, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972), but the fundamentals remain constant. There must be "a
,meaningful' opportunity to be heard." James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085,
1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Cinea v. Certo, 84 F.3d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1996).
167. Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th Cir. 1990).
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"In America, with the object of preventing an arbitrary government,
procedural safeguards were guaranteed to all persons by the inclusion
of 'due process' clauses .... "168 This logic, underscored by such his-
toric decisions as Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,'69
and McNabb v. United States, 170 emphasize the importance of the time-
honored American tradition of procedural due process protection.
In Thomas v. Ward,171 Judge Ward enunciated a list of "minimal
procedural due process" protections applicable to public employment
disputes. Those include:
1) adequate notice; 2) sufficient specification of the charges to permit
the showing of error; 172 3) an opportunity to confront and cross
examine one's accusers; 4) a list of the names and the nature of the
testimony of witnesses testifying against the employee; 5) a fair hearing
before an impartial board with sufficient expertise where the employee
may present evidence in his own defense;1 73 6) the right to have coun-
168. Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988).
169. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm, 341 U.S. 123, 179 (1951) (Douglas, J.
concurring) ("It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law
and rule by whim or caprice.").
170. McNabb, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1947) ("The history of liberty has largely been the
history of observance of procedural safeguards.").
171. Thomas, 374 F. Supp. 206, 211 (M.D.N.C. 1973), affid in pertinent part, 529
F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1975). In Roanoke Chowan Reg'l Hous. Auth., 81 N.C. App. 354,
359, 344 S.E.2d 578, the Court enunciated a similar list of procedural due process
components: 1) timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the deprivation,
2) an opportunity to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses, 3) the right to
legal counsel and participation by counsel, 4) a decision based on the evidence
adduced at the hearing with the reasons for the decision and evidence relied upon in
writing, and 5) an impartial decision maker. See, e.g., Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d 382,
386 (3rd Cir. 1975), where the court enumerated six components: 1) notice, 2)
disclosure of the evidence supporting termination, 3) right to confront and cross
examine, 4) an opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses, 5) a neutral and
detached hearing body, and 6) a written statement from the fact finder as to the
evidence relied upon.
172. See Perry v. Aytch, 724 F.2d 362, 366 (3d Cir. 1983). Some courts require
statements of findings and reasons. See Bogart v. Unified Sch. Dist., 432 F. Supp. 895,
904 (D. Kan. 1977).
173. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271 ("[An impartial decisionmaker is
essential."). The decisionmaker must not be prejudiced. See Miller v. Mission, 705
F.2d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1983); Simard v. Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 988, 993 (2d Cir.
1973) (prejudgment of dispute prohibited). Cases have recognized that ex parte
communications with the decisionmaker can void the proceeding. See Sullivan v.
Dep't of Navy, 720 F.2d 1266, 1270-74 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See generally Robert F.
Maslan, Jr., Note: Bias and the Loudermill Hearing: Due Process or Lip Service to Federal
Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 1093 (1989).
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sel present; and 7) the right to have findings based on substantial evi-
dence before a tribunal making written findings.' 74
The court observed that these rights "may be basic to every due
process hearing, still, in every case the adequacy of the hearing must
be judged on its own facts."'' 7 5
A fair hearing and a fair tribunal is a fundamental requirement for
administrative agencies in North Carolina. 1 76 An agency making a
decision must review and consider the evidence produced at the hear-
ing.' 77 "[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness."'1 78
The North Carolina Supreme Court has reaffirmed that "it is fun-
damental that both unfairness and the appearance of unfairness
should be avoided."'1 7 9 Even an appearance of bias or partiality may
result in a deprivation of due process.' 8 ° Prejudgment of the dispute
has long been constitutionally prohibited.' 8 1 North Carolina recog-
nizes the one member bias rule which provides that a showing of pre-
judgment by only one member of a decision making tribunal is
sufficient to deprive one of procedural due process. 8 2
174. Thomas, 374 F. Supp. at 211.
175. Id.
176. See, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973), quoted in Crump, 326
N.C. at 613, 392 S.E.2d at 584.
177. Morgan v. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1936).
178. In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (holding that it is impermissible
for one to act in a charging capacity and then try the accused).
179. Crump, 326 N.C. at 624, 392 S.E.2d at 590 (quoting American Cyanamid
Company v. F.T.C., 363 F.2d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 1966)). "Ceremonial compliance"
with due process is constitutionally inadequate. Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852,
857 (5th Cir. 1970).
180. See, e.g., In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; Lyness v. Commonwealth, 605 A.2d
1204 (Pa. 1992) (occupational licensing board violated physician's due process rights
where there was commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions within
administrative board); Peleaez v. Waterfront Com. of N.Y., 454 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1982)(fusion of adjudicator and prosecutor in an adversarial proceeding resulted in flawed
hearing).
181. See Morgan, 298 U.S. at 481-82 ("there must be a hearing in a substantial
sense... the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the
evidence .. "); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1995) (occupational licensing
applicant's due process rights violated because of prejudgment); Wilkerson v. Johnson,
699 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir. 1983) (demonstrating "subtle distortions of prejudice.")
182. Crump, 326 N.C. at 618-20, 392 S.E.2d at 587-88 (where only one member
prejudges or is biased, entire tribunal is unconstitutionally tainted thereby violating
procedural due process).
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E. Residual Protections: Sections 35 and 36
Article I, Sections 35 and 36 provide broad residual constitutional
protections. Section 35 proclaims that "A frequent recurrence to fun-
damental principles is absolutely necessary to preserve the blessing of
liberty. '' 18 3 However, the text provides no guidance as to what consti-
tutes "fundamental principles." Thus, the term is left to gather mean-
ing from history, tradition, and other constitutional guarantees.
18 4
Justice Ervin's opinion in Ballance is instructive: "These fundamental
guarantees are very broad in scope, and are intended to secure to each
person . . . extensive individual rights including that of personal
liberty."'
18 5
Section 36 provides that "the enumeration of rights in this article
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the peo-
ple."'18 6 This is almost identical language employed by the Ninth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. i"7 Section 36 is potentially
applicable to a broad range of conduct not explicitly covered by other
provisions in the Declaration of Rights. It suggests the framers' intent
was that other unenumerated personal liberties should also be pro-
tected from governmental infringement.' Section 36 serves as an
independent source of protection for unenumerated constitutional
rights. It reflects the essence of constitutions generally, a limitation on
the scope and power of government.
F. Constitutional Privacy Protection
The right to privacy was recognized over one hundred years ago 18 9
and has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court' 90 and
183. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
184. See State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 762, 762-63, 6 S.E.2d 854, 865 (1940).
Corum relied upon Section 35 in support of its holding. Corum, 330 N.C. at 787, 413
S.E.2d at 292.
185. Ballance, 229 N.C. at 769, 51 S.E.2d at 734.
186. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 36.
187. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Calvin R. Massey, Federalism
and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 305 (1987).
188. In re Martin, 295 N.C. 291, 299, 245 S.E.2d 766, 771 (1978) (recognizing
implied unenumerated constitutional protection under North Carolina Constitution).
189. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410
(1974); Louis Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REV.
693 (1972); Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275 (1974).
190. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (information privacy);
Nixon v. Adm. of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (information privacy).
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North Carolina.1 9 ' The right to privacy may prohibit governmental
intrusion in a number of areas where there is a legitimate expectation
of privacy. The constitutional right of privacy protects the privacy of
individuals against unlawful government invasion.' 92
North Carolina constitutional privacy doctrine is not well devel-
oped or clearly defined. The North Carolina Constitution does not
contain an expressly stated guarantee of constitutional privacy. How-
ever, some North Carolina cases, like numerous federal cases, have
implied a constitutional right to privacy from other constitutional
texts. 19 3 There are numerous North Carolina statutory sources of pri-
vacy protection. 194 There are also a number of statutory cases which
recognize privacy protection under North Carolina statutes. 9 5
In S.E.T.A. UNC-CH v. Huffines, 19 6 the Court of Appeals relied on
privacy grounds to preclude the disclosure of the identity of research-
ers and staff members as confidential personnel information. The
Court ordered that the personnel information about the staff members
be omitted from documents which were otherwise allowed to be dis-
closed. The Court ordered this redaction after observing that "we are
sensitive to the needs of researchers to protect their privacy and the
191. State v. Poe, 40 N.C. App. 385, 252 S.E.2d 843 (1979) (recognizing right of
constitutional privacy but concluding that it did not protect the defendant under the
particular circumstances); Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172, 187-88, 347 S.E.2d
743, 752 (1986) (Martin, J., concurring) ("The Constitution of North Carolina
likewise protects the right of privacy," relying upon Article 1, Section 35).
192. Renwick v. News & Observer Publ'g Co., 310 N.C. 312, 322, 312 S.E. 2d 405,
411 (1984).
193. Poe, 40 N.C. App. 385, 252 S.E.2d 843; Jackson v. Bumgardner, 318 N.C. 172,
187-88, 347 S.E.2d 743, 752 (1986) (Martin, J., concurring) ("The Constitution of
North Carolina likewise protects the right of privacy," relying upon Article 1, Section
35).
194. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-168 (2004) (municipal personnel records);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-98 (2004) (county personnel records); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-
22 (2004) (state employee personnel records).
195. See In re Brooks, 143 N.C. App. 601, 548 S.E.2d 748 (2001); Boesche v.
Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, 111 N.C. App. 149, 153, 432 S.E.2d 137, 140
(1993) (observing that government employees retain "an expectation of privacy and a
right to be free from government intrusion... "); In re Swantee Brooks, 143 N.C. App.
601, 548 S.E.2d 748 (2001) (recognizing privacy protection for personnel files of
police officers). In Elkin Tribune v. Yadkin County Bd. of Comm., a case involving
county employees and application of N.C. GEN. STAT. 153A-98, the Court held that the
names and applications of applicants for the position of county manager enjoyed
privacy protection and were governed by the statute which makes employee personnel
files generally confidential. 331 N.C. 735, 417 S.E.2d 465 (1992).
196. S.E.T.A. UNC-CH, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 292, 399 S.E.2d 340 (1991).
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privacy of their staffs. 1 9 7 The breadth of the various personnel pri-
vacy provisions under North Carolina law was reaffirmed in Durham
Herald v. County of Durham,1 98 where the Court concluded that appli-
cations for a vacancy in the office of sheriff were also governed by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 153A-98 and enjoyed privacy protection. These limited
statutory privacy provisions do not preclude discovery in employment
litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Constitution was neglected in the 1960s and
1970s. North Carolina has enjoyed gradual state constitutional redis-
covery since the 1980s, affording additional protection commensurate
with the need to restrain growing abuse of government power. Federal
courts were once thought to be the mainstream forum for protection
for individual rights, thus many litigants continued to use federal
courts while the North Carolina Constitution laid somewhat dormant.
However, the history of North Carolina constitutional law reveals that
North Carolina courts have usually afforded more meaningful consti-
tutional protection than federal courts have granted. North Carolina
has not retreated to rapidly changing ideological constitutional law,
which has promoted predictability and stare decisis in North Carolina
constitutional law. The teachings of Justice Ervin, Judge Craven, Chief
Justice Exum, Justice Martin, and other North Carolina jurists offer a
promising framework of state constitutional protection for the new
millennium.
Many new challenges and dangers lie ahead in light of the growing
abuse of government power in North Carolina. Ms. Willis should be
allowed to dance in Marshall without banishment by the town govern-
ment. Fortunately, government did not ban Elvis from dancing and
singing in the 1950s. North Carolina law enforcement officers should
be free of retaliatory discipline for not writing a minimum five tickets
per day as sanctioned by the Fourth Circuit. State employees should
be allowed to settle a claim without the retaliatory wrath of the state
bureaucracy as inflicted on Algie Toomer. The North Carolina Consti-
tution is available to remedy these and other growing abuses of power.
The North Carolina Constitution is a sacred text; it is the founda-
tion of our governmental structure; it is the essential guarantor of our
basic civil liberties. The North Carolina Constitution must be used by
counsel and vigorously enforced by North Carolina Courts as man-
197. Id. at 296, 399 S.E.2d at 343.
198. Durham Herald v. County of Durham., 334 N.C. 677, 435 S.E. 2d 317 (1993).
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dated by Ballance, Corum, and their rich antecedents and progeny.
North Carolina citizens will consequently be better protected from
abuse of government power.
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